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BRINGING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION WITHIN THE ACTIVE
JURISDICTION OF THE ICC
Donald M Ferencz*
Although aggression is listed among the four core crimes within the pur-
view of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Court has thus far been
powerless to exercise jurisdiction over the crime. The Rome Statute of the
ICC prohibits the Court from doing so until provisions are adopted defining
the crime and setting forth the conditions under which jurisdiction may be
exercised. A review conference is scheduled for 2010, where this issue is
expected to be addressed. The following article discusses the significant
differences between various amendment protocols specified within Article
121 of the Rome Statute and explores how such differences may be strategi-
cally relevant to the adoption ofprovisions on aggression. Regardless of the
amendment regime employed in making the crime of aggression actionable
before the ICC, the author concludes that adoption ofprovisions on aggres-
sion are an important step in strengthening the rule of law and the Nurem-
berg principles.
1. INTRODUCTION
When the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
was adopted on July 17, 1998, it included provisions granting the ICC juris-
diction over four core crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and the crime of aggression.' The first three of these crimes are de-
fined within the Statute itself and were, from inception, brought within the
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delegation to the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression. See infra note 5. He
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I Article 5(1) identifies the four core crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and the crime of aggression. In this article, the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court will be referred to simply as "the Statute or the Rome Statute" and the Inter-
national Criminal Court itself will be referred to either as "the Court" or "the ICC." See
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter ICC Statute], available at http//www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-
5752-4F84-BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/RomeStatuteEnglish.pdf (identifying the four core
crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression).
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Court's active jurisdiction.2 By contrast, the Statute provides that the
Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression cannot be exercised until
such time as a provision is adopted by the member countries of the Assem-
bly of States Parties (ASP) 3 defining the crime and establishing the condi-
tions under which the Court may exercise its jurisdiction.4
The challenge of developing proposals for such further provisions
relating to the crime of aggression has been vested in a subgroup of the
ASP, known as the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression.5
The Working Group has met in both formal and informal sessions, where
representatives from States Parties, along with certain non-States Parties
and NGO observers, have endeavored to craft workable proposals on the
crime of aggression for consideration at a Review Conference, expected to
be held in 2010. It is at such a Review Conference that the States Parties
2 See id. arts. 5(1), 6, 7, 8 (listing the four core crimes and setting forth the definitions of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes).
3 The ASP, established pursuant to Article 112, is the administrative body with general
management oversight responsibility for the various organs of the Court. See id art. 112.
4 Article 5(2) specifies that:
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision
is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting
out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to
this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Id. art. 5(2). This provision was a compror.q, reached in 1998 at the Rome Conference,
stemming from the fact that the question of wi~ether to include aggression within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court was highly contentious; hence, the issue of how to trigger the Court's active
jurisdiction over the crime was left for later resolution. It should be noted that Article 5(2)
refers to Article 121, but does not clarify which paragraphs, in particular, of Article 121 are
intended to be followed. This omission is significant, since paragraphs four and five of Ar-
ticle 121 are mutually exclusive as to their application. For an article written immediately
preceding the Conference of Rome, see Michael P. Scharf, Rome Diplomatic Conference for
an International Criminal Court, A.S.I.L. INSIGHTS (June 1998), available at http://asil.org/
insights/insigh20.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
5 What is now known as the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression was
established pursuant to proposals made via the ASP in 2002. The Working Group is the
successor to what was previously referred to as the Working Group on the Crime of Aggres-
sion, which had begun the task of developing proposals on the crime of aggression during the
Preparatory Commission for the Intemational Criminal Court. See Prepatory Comm'n for the
Int'l Criminal Court, List of Documents of the Report of the Prepatory Commission, U.N.
Doc. PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2 (July 24, 2002), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/
prepcomm/report/prepreportdocs.htm. For a "user-friendly" overview of relevant documents
pertaining to the work of both the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression and the Spe-
cial Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, including background information, see
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression (last
visited Nov. 5, 2009). In this article, the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression
(SPWGCA) will be generally referred to simply as "the Working Group."
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will decide whether to move forward with bringing the crime of aggression
within the active jurisdiction of the Court.
Against this backdrop, on September 26, 2008 the Case Western
Reserve University School of Law hosted a symposium on the crime of
aggression, providing a forum where international law experts met to ex-
plore a number of critical issues still confronting the Working Group. 6 It
was my privilege to chair one of the symposium panels, entitled A Roundta-
ble Discussion About the Process by Which Aggression is Included in the
Statute and Its Effect on Non-Party States.7 Among the most significant
aspects of this admittedly rather arcane-sounding topic is that, depending
upon the placement of proposed provisions on aggression within the Statute,
the Court's effective jurisdiction over the crime of aggression may vary
quite dramatically. This article will highlight some of the key technical is-
sues raised during the panel discussion and will offer several personal ob-
servations regarding enabling the Court, at long last, to exercise its active
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.8
At the outset of any discussion of this topic, a clear distinction must
be drawn between the general rule of how amendments to the Statute are
adopted-and, therefore, become part of the textual fabric of the Sta-
tute-as opposed to how amendments actually enter into force for States
Parties-and, therefore, become legally effective and enforceable from a
juridical point of view.
6 See generally 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. (2009) (Nos. 2 & 3).
7 The Case Western Reserve University School of Law is located in Cleveland, Ohio. The
symposium was held at the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center and is viewable in its
entirety as a webcast at http://law.case.edu/centers/cox/webcast.asp?dt=-20080926&type=
flv&a=0 [hereinafter Webcast]. The link to the webcast of the specific panel that I moderated
may be found at http://law.case.edu/centers/cox/webcast.asp?dt=20080926&type=flv&a=6.
The panellists in our roundtable discussion were Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni of DePaul
University College of Law in Chicago, Illinois (who served as Chair of the Drafting Commit-
tee at the Rome Conference); Professor Roger Clark, of Rutgers University Law School in
Camden, New Jersey (who was directly involved during the Rome Conference in drafting
various provisions, including Article 121 of the Statute); Astrid Reisinger Coracini, Lectur-
er, Institute of International Law and International Relations , University of Graz, Austria;
and Stefan Barriga, Counsellor/Legal Adviser, Permanent Mission of Lichtenstein to the
U.N. (whose Ambassador, Christian Wenaweser, served as the Chair of the Working Group
on the Crime of Aggression). Their summary biographical details are set forth on the Case
Western Reserve School of Law website at httpJ/law.case.edu/lectures/files/2008-2009/
20080926_WCROSymp-Agenda-SpeakersBios.pdf.
8 I say "at long last" because it was as far back as December 11, 1946 that the General
Assembly of the U.N., in G.A. Res. 95(), affirmed the Nuremberg Charter and the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal judgment and called for the codification of an international criminal
code based on the principles of international criminal law embodied therein. See G.A. Res
95(1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946).
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The general rule for adoption of substantive amendments to the
Rome Statute is found in Article 121(3), which provides that amendments
may either be adopted by way of consensus or by a two-thirds vote of the
ASP. 9 Articles 121(4) and 121(5) govern the procedures by which such
amendments come into force, and they differ markedly as to their effects.
For example, pursuant to Article 121(5), amendments to Articles 5,
6, 7 and 8 of the Statute will only be effective as to crimes committed on the
territory of or by the nationals of States Parties who independently ratify
such amendments. 0 Thus, if the proposed provisions on aggression come
within the ambit of Article 121(5), States Parties would appear to be able to
exempt themselves from the application of such provisions-with respect to
the Court's jurisdiction under Article 12, but not necessarily with respect to
situations referred by the Security Council1'-merely by electing not to
independently ratify them, and they need not withdraw from the Statute
itself to do so.
By stark contrast, Article 121(4) provides that amendments not
covered by Article 121(5) shall enter into force for all States Parties after
ratification of such amendments by a seven-eighths vote of the members of
the ASP. 12 Because of this, if an amendment is seen as coming within the
purview of Article 121(4), such amendment could potentially come into
force with respect to all States Parties, including States Parties opposed to
it. In such case, States Parties opposed to the amendment have two choices:
they may either do nothing, thereby accepting its coming into force as to
them, or they may elect to completely withdraw from the Statute, thereby
ceasing to be States Parties. 1
3
9 Article 121(3) provides that "[t]he adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the As-
sembly of States Parties or at a Review Conference on which consensus cannot be reached
shall require a two-thirds majority of States Parties." ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(3).
10 Article 121(5) provides that:
Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for
those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit
of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which
has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction re-
garding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party's
nationals or on its territory.
Id. art. 121(5).
11 For a discussion of Articles 12 and 13, see infra notes 26, 27.
12 Article 121(4) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in paragraph 5, an amendment shall
enter into force for all States Parties one year after instruments of ratification or acceptance
have been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations by seven-eighths of
then." ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(4).
3 For withdrawal procedures, see id arts. 121(6), 127. With respect to the issue of with-
drawal from the Statute, it should be noted that Article 120 does not allow for reservations to
the Statute. Therefore, a State Party may not "cherry-pick" as to which amendments it will
534 [Vol. 42:531
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Before proceeding to a discussion of the issues raised by the sym-
posium panel which I chaired, a few words are in order regarding a major
policy issue which has confronted the Working Group relative to the issue
of the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Article 39 of the
U.N. Charter vests the Security Council with authority to determine whether
an act of aggression by a State has occurred. 14 Relying on this, representa-
tives of each of the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as a
number of States Parties, have posited that there can be no exercise of juris-
diction by the Court over the crime of aggression without some sort of pre-
determination by the Security Council that an act of aggression by a State
has occurred."5 When the General Assembly, in resolution 3314, adopted a
accept and not except-leaving complete withdrawal from the Statute as the only permitted
option should a State Party find that it does not wish to be bound by amendments which have
become effective under provisions of the Statute other than Article 121(5).
14 See U.N. Charter art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommenda-
tions, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to main-
tain or restore international peace and security.").
15 With respect to this issue, it is noteworthy that the U.S. sent its first-ever delegation to
meetings of the ASP in November 2009, where U.S. concurrence in this position was clearly
enunciated. See Stephen J. Rapp, U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, Speech
to the Assembly of States Parties (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/Statements/ICC-ASP-ASP8-GenDeba-USA-ENG.pdf. Of the
five permanent members of the Security Council, only the U.S. had failed to send representa-
tives to attend meetings of the Working Group; representatives from France, the U.K., Rus-
sia, and China all actively participated. For a summary of the issues discussed by the Work-
ing Group since the Case Western symposium met in September 2008, see International
Criminal Court, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression of the Assembly of
States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Annex Il, ICC-
ASP/7/20, available at http:/www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/aspdocs/SWGCA/ICC-ASP-7-20-
Ann.III%20English.pdf (reporting on meetings of the SPWGA held during November 2008)
(last visited Nov. 5, 2009); International Criminal Court, Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression of the Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Special Working Group
on the Crime of Aggression, Annex I, ICC-ASP/7/20/Add.1, available at httpJ/www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ICC-ASP-7-20-Add. 1-SWGCA%20English.pdf (reporting on meet-
ings of the SWGCA held in February 2009); International Criminal Court, Assembly of
State Parties, Informal Inter-sessional Meeting on the Crime of Aggression, Hosted by the
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, at the Princeton
Club, New York, from 8 to 10 June 2009, ICC-ASP/8/INF.2 (2009) (the first twenty-five
pages of which are appended hereto as an addendum to this article). For the most recent
discussions within the Working Group prior to the Case Western symposium, see Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression of the Assembly
of States Parties, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Ann. H,
ICC-ASP/6/20/Add.1, available at http'/www.icc- cpi.int/iccdocs/aspdocs/SWGCA/ICC-
ASP-6-20-Addl-AnnexlI-ENG.pdf [hereinafter June 2008 Report]. See also Informal Inter-
sessional Meeting on the Crime ofAggression 8-10 June 2009, Non-paper by the Chairman
on the Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/SWGCA/Non-paper-conditions-jurisdiction-28May2009-ENG.pdf
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definition of aggression by consensus in 1974, it paid due deference to this
principle, fully recognizing, certainly at least as its powers under Chapter 7
of the U.N. Charter are concerned, that the Security Council has the right to
determine whether acts which might presumptively constitute acts of State
aggression would, in fact, be so characterized. 16 In opposition to this view,
others in the Working Group have argued that a pre-determinative role for
the Security Council with respect to whether an act of State aggression has
occurred may hamper the independence of the Court, that such a role would
be inconsistent with the impartial judicial functioning of the Court, and that
such a role is not mandated by the U.N. Charter. 17
II. REVIEW OF ROUNDTABLE ISSUES
As discussed above, the Rome Statute allows for markedly different
regimes with respect to the application of the Court's exercise of jurisdic-
tion over the crime of aggression, depending upon whether provisions on
aggression are adopted as a matter of amendment to Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8
or whether such provisions on aggression come into the Statute via some
other means.
On its face, Article 121(5) signifies a clear intention, at least insofar
as amendments to Article 5 are concerned, to give States Parties the right to
opt out of prospective provisions pertaining to the crime of aggression with-
out having to withdraw from the Statute to do so.18 Yet, by its express
terms, Article 121(5) applies only in case of "amendment" to the articles of
the Statute currently delineating or defining the core crimes. 9 The question
of whether a provision completing the mandate found in Article 5(2) res-
pecting aggression will be deemed to constitute an "amendment" to Article
(a 2009 revision of a discussion paper on the crime of aggression proposed by the Chairman)
[hereinafter Chairman's Non-paper].
16 See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974), available at httpI/
www.un.org/documents/ga/res/29/ares29.htm.
17 See June 2008 Report, supra note 15. For a discussion of whether the Security Council
has exclusive authority under the U.N. Charter to determine the existence of acts of aggres-
sion beyond the scope of its Chapter 7 powers under the U.N. Charter, see Mark S. Stein, The
Security Council, the International Criminal Court, and the Crime of Aggression: How Ex-
clusive is the Security Council's Power to Determine Aggression?, 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 1 (2005) (discussing and concluding that the Security Council does not have such ex-
clusive authority). Advance copies of Professor Stein's article were disseminated to the
Working Group when it met at an informal session at Princeton University in the summer of
2005. See also Carrie McDougall, When Law And Reality Clash-The Imperative of Com-
promise in the Context of the Accumulated Evil of the Whole: Conditions for the Exercise of
the International Criminal Court's Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression, 7 INT'L CRIM.
L. REv. 2, 3 (2007).
18 See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(5).
19 Id.
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5 within the meaning of Article 121(5) was raised by our panelists and is
particularly relevant, since much of what has thus far been proposed within
the Working Group has contemplated adopting provisions on aggression
which would come into the Statute outside of Article 5 itself.
With respect to this issue, Professor Bassiouni initially observed
that, while "legal imagination has no bounds," the notion that a provision on
aggression would not be deemed to be "an amendment" within the meaning
of Article 121(5) "is doubtful," and that, therefore, "any way you look at it"
language which adds to-as opposed to modifies-the existing language of
Article 5 "is subject to the opting out provision that we have in 121(5). "9 20 A
contrary view was strenuously expressed by Professor Clark, who argued
that insofar as the contemplated provisions on aggression thus far discussed
within the Working Group are proposed to fall elsewhere in the Statute
-that is, outside of Article 5 itself--they are clearly to be governed by the
rules found in Article 121(4) because they simply do not constitute a literal
amendment to Article 5.21 He recognized, however, that the inclusion of an
amendment on aggression within the Statute may be politically untenable if
it does not allow an "opt-out" mechanism, such as is found in Article
121(5).22 Because of this, he initially suggested that it may be necessary to
consider possible amendment of Article 121(4) to allow for such an "opting-
out" possibility, yet his concluding remarks were much more in the direc-
tion of amending Article 5 itself to bring the contemplated provisions on
aggression more squarely within the ambit of Article 121(5)'s "opt-out"
regime. 23
Among the various issues highlighted by Ms. Reisinger Coracini
was the prospect of jurisdictional inconsistency between treatment of na-
tionals of non-States Parties and those of States Parties who have opted out
of the Court's general jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 24 For ex-ample, Article 121(5) may be read to exempt nationals of non-accepting
20 Professor Bassiouni's remarks may be viewed online. See Webcast, supra note 7. It
should also be mentioned that, as a general matter, he expressed the view that the complexity
and variety of potential regimes being considered with respect to the exercise of the Court's
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression may be likened to swiss cheese, giving rise to mul-
tiple standards of justice, rather than a uniform application of criminal law. Because of this,
he questioned whether the crime of aggression should be brought within the active jurisdic-
tion of the Court rather than simply be left as is, with symbolic, rather than operational, ef-
fect within the Rome Statute. Moreover, he cautioned that to have a regime on aggression
that does not apply equally to all is to risk eroding the legitimacy and credibility of the Court
itself, so as to possibly undermine its reputation with respect to enforcement of the other
three core crimes.
21 See id.
22 id.
23 id.
24 Id.
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States Parties from prosecution for the crime of aggression, even if commit-
ted on the territory of an accepting State Party.25 But does it not seem high-
ly incongruous that such nationals should be put in a better position than the
nationals of non-States Parties who could be subject to the Court's jurisdic-
tion-under the rules set forth in Article 12 of the Statute-for the very
same conduct? 26 And what of referrals to the Court by the Security Council
under Article 13(b) of the Statute; would the reach of the Court's jurisdic-
tion incident to such referrals not, as a matter of logic, "trump" the exemp-
tion provisions for nationals of State Parties who have opted out of the
crime of aggression under Article 121(5)?27 The resolution of these prob-
lems, in Ms. Reisinger Coracini's view, with Professor Clark initially seem-
ing to concur,28 may best be achieved by adopting all relevant amendments
on aggression under the rubric of Article 121(4), so as to engender consis-
tency as to the effect of such amendments.29
Our final panelist was Stefan Barriga, the legal counsel to the Per-
manent Mission of Liechtenstein to the U.N. He pragmatically observed
25 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(5).
26 Article 12(2) of the Statute provides, in pertinent part:
In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdic-
tion if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have ac-
cepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred,
or ....
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
Id. art. 12(2) (emphasis added). For a brief discussion of Article 13, see infra note 27.
27 Article 13 of the Statute provides that:
The court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article
5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if:
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with ar-
ticle 14;
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in
accordance with article 15.
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 13 (emphasis added).
28 See Webcast, supra note 7.
29 Unrelated to this point, during our open discussion at the end of the roundtable presenta-
tions Ms. Reisinger Coracini referenced the fact that Croatia has a specific provision on
aggression within its criminal code. For anyone who may be interested, it may be found
online at the website of the International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law
section of the T.M.C. Asser Institute, httpJ/www.wihl.nl/finals/CroatiaHR.L-PC.Penal
%20Code%20(extracts). 1998.pdf.
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that the question of whether a provision on aggression will be adopted ulti-
mately involves considerations rooted in power, politics, and sovereignty,
and in what can be agreed to at the Review Conference, regardless of the
"correct" legal interpretation pertaining to the technical issues addressed
during our roundtable.30
With this in mind, Mr. Barriga raised two additional issues for con-
sideration, the first of which concerns parity between countries that are
States Parties and countries that, while not yet States Parties, might join the
ASP in the future. His first issue questioned if States Parties at the time of
the Review Conference are deemed to have the right, pursuant to Article
121(5), to opt out of the Court's jurisdiction over aggression conferred un-
der Article 12, should countries which become States Parties at a later time
not have the same right?
31
His second observation regarding issues which may warrant further
exploration relates to the question of where the crime of aggression will
ultimately be deemed to be committed--that is, whether the provisions on
aggression will be crafted so as to provide that the crime is deemed to be
committed on the territory of the victim state, versus the territory of the
aggressor state.32 In this regard, Mr. Barriga pointed out that, since the
crime of aggression is a leadership crime involving activities that normally
occur on the territory of the aggressor state-that is, where the planning
occurs-it may be more tenable for certain non-States Parties as well as
States Parties which opt out under Article 121(5) if the crime is deemed to
be committed on the aggressor's territory.33 In such case, Article 12's gen-
eral preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court would not be
met; therefore, other than with respect to referrals by the Security Council
provided for in Article 13, the Court would generally lack jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression for non-assenting states nationals.
Mr. Barriga's comments were followed by those of Ambassador
Christian Wenaweser, the Chairman of the Working Group, who, from the
audience, remarked that the ratification regime under Article 121(5) will
likely be less objectionable to the permanent members of the Security
Council (the P-5) than the seven-eighths ratification regime found in 121(4),
which, once achieved, binds all States Parties.34 He expressed the clear view
that Article 121(5)'s opt-out regime offers the balance that may be needed
to overcome P-5 concerns, in the event that proposed amendments on ag-
30 See Webcast, supra note 7.
31 Id.
32 id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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gression empower the Court to prosecute the crime without Security Coun-
cil pre-clearance as to whether such prosecutions may proceed. 3
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
I was born in Nuremberg, Germany, and I am the son of a former
prosecutor at the Subsequent Proceedings there.36 I have grown up with a
lifelong awareness that aggressive war is something that ought to be cur-
tailed, if possible, through the rule of law. I appreciate that there are legiti-
mate differences of opinion regarding perceived procedural ambiguities
within the Rome Statute. So, too, are there divergent views as to which
strategies may be most effective in terms of their political viability with
respect to the crime of aggression.
My own sense is that the ASP would do well to embrace an ap-
proach consistent with Article 121(5), comporting with the apparent inten-
tion of its drafters and in deference to the reality that not all States Parties
are yet prepared to be bound by the Court's general jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression. At the same time, under Article 121(5), at least some
States Parties could elect to be so bound, thereby sending a message to
would-be perpetrators of the crime of aggression that the world in which
they may operate with impunity is shrinking. By contrast, the seven-eighths
threshold, all-in-or-all-out, requirement of Article 121(4) provides a much
easier target for those who may wish to use their influence to undermine
adoption of a provision on aggression, since under Article 121(4) a minority
of just over one-eighth of the ASP membership can thwart the will of even
an overwhelming majority of States Parties.37
In light of the divergence of views among the P-5 and non P-5
States Parties as to which mechanisms for the exercise of jurisdiction may
be preferable, and in order to overcome any perceived ambiguities as to
whether Articles 121(4) or 121(5) apply, I would propose that the provi-
sions on aggression are adopted in a manner which clarifies that they are
intended to be construed as coming within the ambit of Article 121(5).
Common sense and moral, as well as legal, outrage at aggressive
war certainly tends in the direction of giving victim states the right to insti-
35 Id. Without wanting to sound in any way glib, I would be remiss if I failed to mention
that, reacting to Professor Bassiouni's contention that "swiss cheese" is to be avoided (see
supra note 20), Ambassador Wenaweser (of Liechtenstein) emphasized his comfort level
with the application of Article 121(5) by reminding all those present that "I'm not from a part
of the world where swiss cheese is looked down upon." See Webcast, supra note 7.
36 My father, Benjamin Ferencz, was the Chief Prosecutor of what has come to be known
as The Einsatzgruppen Case, where defendants were convicted for the ruthless murder of
over one million innocent civilians. For his writings on the crime of aggression, please view
his website at http'/benferencz.org/.
37 See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(4).
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gate prosecution of those who perpetrate the crime of aggression. Yet, as
Mr. Barriga observed, if the crime is deemed to be committed on the territo-
ry of the victim state, then those who prefer not to opt-in to the Court's ju-
risdiction under Article 121(5) may be motivated to discourage forward
progress with respect to activating the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over
the crime for fear of possibly seeing their own nationals prosecuted under
the territorial rules of Article 12.
With this problem in mind, several years ago I circulated a private
paper to a number of delegates to the Working Group suggesting that, inso-
far as the opt-in provisions of Article 121(5) are tantamount to an opt-out
regime for non-assenting states, a possible hybrid solution might be to pur-
sue adopting two separate amendments on aggression, each of which would
be subject to the rules of Article 121(5). One such amendment could vest
the Court with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression pursuant to the ex-
isting provisions of Article 12, with such amendment only effective as to
those State Parties which specifically ratify it. A second, alternative,
amendment might be crafted which would grant the Court jurisdiction under
Article 12, but subject to specific pre-clearance by the Security Council in
one form or another. Once again, such amendment would only be effective
as to State Parties which choose to ratify it.38 Presumptively, State Parties
declining to adopt either amendment would be completely beyond the reach
38 In the most recent Chairman's non-paper, a somewhat similar approach-at least in
terms of its effect-is offered for consideration: that is, to allow Article 121(4), rather than
121(5), to control as the mechanism for adoption of a provision on the crime of aggression,
but to couple such an approach with a specific opt-out regime, whereby States Parties (and
possibly even non-States Parties) could affirmatively opt out of the Court's jurisdiction for
whatever period of time may suit them. See Chairman's Non-paper, supra note 15, 11, 12.
This paper states, in pertinent part:
The Group's reports refer to the idea of requiring that the alleged aggressor State
has accepted the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression by way of an
opt-in declaration. The requirement of such a declaration would effectively limit
the Court's jurisdiction on the basis of State referrals and proprio motu investiga-
tions to cases of alleged aggression by States Parties that have accepted the
amendment on aggression and have made a declaration accepting the amendment.8
As a consequence, the difference in the application of either paragraph 4 or 5 of ar-
ticle 121 to the amendment on aggression would be strongly diminished: Either
way, no State Party could be subject to the Court's jurisdiction on aggression
against its will.
The idea of a declaration could be further adapted in order to increase the likely-
hood that the Court would indeed have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in
future cases. Instead of requiring an opt-in declaration, States could be given the
possibility of making an opt-out declaration regarding the crime of aggression sim-
ilar to article 124 of the Statute. In order to fully address sovereignty concerns,
such a declaration could possibly be renewable, and possibly be open for non-
States Parties as well.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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of the Court's jurisdiction on aggression, other than pursuant to a Security
Council referral.39
Such a two-track approach acknowledges that certain countries may
be prepared to accept the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression only if Security Council pre-clearance is a prerequisite to such
exercise of jurisdiction. In a two-amendment approach, when, and if, the
time is right, State Parties which have opted for the more conservative, Se-
curity Council pre-clearance approach, could, at least theoretically, at a later
time reconsider their position without the need for any additional action by
the ASP; they could simply subsequently ratify the broader jurisdictional
amendment, which would then apply to crimes committed on their territory
or by their nationals even without Security Council pre-clearance.
At Nuremberg, the crime of aggression was characterized as "the
supreme international crime. One would hope that the truth of these
poignant words will be enough to carry the day at the Review Conference
and that consensus will be reached as to a regime on aggression which is
acceptable to all concerned. Those who offer their best efforts to help bring
this crime within the reach of the law--indelibly branding aggressive war-
making with the stigma of illegality that it so richly deserves-will know, at
least, that they have tried.
It is to be hoped and, by those who pray, prayed that this will be a
generation in which the foundation of the law will provide a firm anvil upon
which humankind may move forward in the process of beating its swords
into ploughshares.4 Granting the ICC active jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression may prove a critical step on that path.
39 As to the question of non-States Parties, my own view is they should be no worse off
than States Parties and, therefore, that the provisions on jurisdiction over the crime of aggres-
sion should not bind them unless they have elected to be so bound.
40 The judgment of the International Military Tribunal, under the heading The Common
Plan or Conspiracy and Aggressive War, reads, in relevant part, as follows: "To initiate a
war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international
crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated
evil of the whole." See Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946,
reprinted in 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 172, 186 (1947).
41 See Isaiah 2:4 (The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha: Revised Stan-
dard Version) ("He shall judge between the nations, and shall decide for many peoples; and
they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall
not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.").
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I. Introduction
1. Pursuant to a recommendation by the Assembly of States Parties and at the invitation
of the Government of Liechtenstein, an informal inter-sessional meeting on the Crime of
Aggression was hosted by the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow
Wilson School, on the premises of the Princeton Club, New York, United States of America,
from 8 to 10 June 2009. Invitations to participate in the meeting had been sent to all States, as
well as to representatives of civil society. H.R.H. Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan)
chaired the meeting.
2. The participants in the informal inter-sessional meeting expressed their appreciation
to the Governments of Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Sweden and Switzerland for the financial support they had provided for the meeting and to
the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University for hosting the event
and the financial support.
3. The participants noted with appreciation that the meeting was held on the premises of
the Princeton Club in New York, thereby enabling the presence of delegations that had in the
past been denied permission to travel to Princeton to attend previous inter-sessional meetings
of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (hereinafter "the Group").
4. The present document does not necessarily represent the views of the governments
that the participants represent. It seeks to reflect the opinions expressed on various issues
pertaining to the crime of aggression on the basis of the proposals for a provision on
aggression elaborated by the Group and adopted on 13 February 2009.' It is hoped that the
material in the present report will facilitate the future work of the Assembly of States Parties
on the crime of aggression, in particular during the upcoming eighth session, to be held in The
Hague from 18 to 26 November 2009.
1 See February 2009 SWGCA report, in Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Seventh session (first and second resumptions), New York,
19-23 January and 9-13 February 2009 (International Criminal Court publication, ICC-
ASP/7/20/Add. 1), chapter II, annex II, appendix I.
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5. The discussions were held on the basis of two papers submitted by the Chairman: a
non-paper on the Elements of Crimes 2, as well as a non-paper on the conditions for the
exercise of jurisdiction. 3 The Chairman introduced both non-papers and recalled the
significant progress that had been made by the Group, culminating in the adoption of the
Group's final report in February 2009. He underlined that the future work on aggression
should focus on the outstanding issues left over from the Group, as well as the Elements of
Crimes. The Chairman furthermore noted that the participation of both States Parties and non-
States Parties was essential, despite the fact that the Group no longer existed as such. The
future format of the work on aggression would have to be decided by the Assembly of States
Parties at its next session.
II. Non-paper on the Elements of the crime of aggression
6. The Chairman recalled earlier discussions on the drafting of the Elements of the
crime of aggression and expressed his appreciation to the delegations of Australia and Samoa,
which had prepared a first draft of the Elements, as well as to the delegation of Switzerland,
which had organized a small informal retreat on this topic.4 This work formed the basis for the
Chairman's non-paper on the Elements of Crimes, which was submitted to facilitate
discussions.
7. The Chairman recalled the drafting of the existing Elements of Crimes5, which had
been a very useful exercise in that it deepened the understanding of the definition of the
crimes. He recalled that the purpose of the Elements of Crimes was to assist the Court in the
interpretation and application of the definitions of crimes6, including by clarifying the precise
mental element required in accordance with article 30 of the Rome Statute.
8. In introducing the non-paper, the Chairman explained that the Elements of the crime
of aggression would be added to the existing Elements of Crimes. Therefore, the existing
general introduction to the Elements of Crimes would also apply to the crime of aggression.
The non-paper suggested that the general introduction would require a technical amendment,
replacing the words "articles 6, 7 and 8" with the words "articles 6, 7, 8 and 8 bis".
Otherwise, the general introduction could be applied to the crime of aggression without
further modification. No objections were raised to this suggested technical amendment and no
proposals were made to further modify the general introduction to the Elements of Crimes.
9. Appendix I of the non-paper contains the draft Elements of Crimes, which include a
special introduction to the Elements of the crime of aggression. The Chairman explained that
such a special introduction could provide additional guidance in relation to several issues
related to the proposed Elements. In order to facilitate a focused discussion, the Chairman
suggested taking up each paragraph of the special introduction in the context of the Elements
to which they relate.
General comments on the draft Elements
10. Overall, the draft Elements were considered to form a good basis for future work and
their structure met with general support. It was observed that the Elements were a list of all
material and mental elements that the Prosecutor had to prove in any given case. The draft
adhered to the logic of article 30 of the Rome Statute by listing material and mental elements.
2 See annex II.
3 See annex Um.
4 Held in Montreux, Switzerland, from 16-18 April 2009.
5 Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, First session, New York, 3-10 September 2002 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.V.2
and corrigendum), part lI.B.6 Article 9 of the Rome Statute.
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The material elements could be categorized as conduct, consequence or circumstance, and
were followed by the corresponding mental elements (intent and knowledge). The default rule
of article 30 automatically applied to any material element to which no specific mental
element was expressly attached. It was observed that it was sometimes difficult to clearly
categorize a material element (in particular proposed Element 3, as well as proposed Element
5). Nevertheless, that theoretical distinction had no practical effect as long as there was
agreement on the required mental element.
11. It was observed that the order of the draft Elements followed the general structure of
the Elements of Crimes (conduct, consequences and circumstances are generally listed in that
order),7 with the exception of Element 2, which was clearly a circumstance element, but one
that was very closely related to the perpetrator and his or her conduct. Some delegations
queried whether the order of Elements 3 to 6 could be changed. In response, it was noted that
Element 3 contained the material element of the act of aggression, to which Element 4
provided the respective mental element. Similarly, Element 5 contained the material element
of the threshold of a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter, to which Element 6
provided the mental element. It was important to have each mental element follow
immediately after the material element to which it related; otherwise the default rule
contained in article 30 of the Rome Statute would automatically apply to that material
element.
12. Regarding the special introduction to the Elements of the crime of aggression, it was
observed that similar introductions precede the other Elements of Crimes. A suggestion was
made to consider whether the statements contained in the introduction were not better placed
in a new section following after the Elements, as they were not really introductory in nature.
Proposed Element 1: The conduct element
13. Proposed Element 1 sets out the conduct element for the crime of aggression by
describing the conduct of the perpetrator. The non-paper notes that, since the nature of
Element I as a conduct element was sufficiently clear, the draft did not contain any express
mental element. The default mental element in article 30, paragraph 2(a), of the Rome Statute
would therefore apply: the person had intent where that person "means to engage in the
conduct". While there was only limited discussion on proposed Element 1, no objections were
raised with respect to its drafting.
Proposed Element 2: The leadership clause
14. As noted in the non-paper, proposed Element 2 reflects the leadership nature of the
crime and is a circumstance element. In accordance with article 30, paragraph 3, of the Rome
Statute, the perpetrator must therefore have been aware that he or she was in a position
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of the State that
committed the act of aggression. The non-paper suggests that the application of article 30 is
sufficiently clear and that there is therefore no need to articulate an express mental element
attaching to Element 2.
15. Proposed Element 2 furthermore contains a footnote, clarifying that, with respect to
any particular situation involving an act of aggression, more than one person may be in a
leadership position. Some drafting changes were explored with respect to proposed
Element 2. It was suggested to delete the word "a person" and to move the footnote to the
7 See paragraph 7 of the general introduction to the Elements of Crimes, in Official Records of the
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, First session, New
York, 3-10 September 2002 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.V.2 and corrigendum), part lI.B.
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word "perpetrator". There was, however, only a brief discussion on this suggestion, and no
such changes to the draft were subsequently made.
Proposed Elements 3 and 4: The State act of aggression
16. Proposed Element 3 describes the material element of the State act of aggression. It
draws from the language of draft article 8 bis, paragraph 2, of the Group's proposals by
referring to "the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter
of the United Nations". It was noted that Element 3 contained the core of the definition of the
State act of aggression and was not intended to, and indeed could not, by virtue of article 9 of
the Rome Statute, change the definition of the State act contained in the Group's proposals.
This was confirmed by the first paragraph of the special introduction, which clarified the
understanding that "any of the acts referred to in article 8 bis, paragraph 2, qualify as an act of
aggression". This way, the lengthy article 8 bis, paragraph 2, would not have to be reproduced
in its entirety in the Elements.
17. Proposed Element 4 then sets out the mental element required for Element 3 and
suggests a "factual circumstance" element. The Chairman explained that such a type of
element was used frequently in the context of certain crimes against humanity and war crimes
where legal concepts were involved. Proposed Element 4 would thus require that the
perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that establish the inconsistency of the
State's use of armed force with the United Nations Charter. The reference to factual
circumstances would avoid unintended consequences of a stricter standard, which could
encourage a potential perpetrator to be wilfully blind as to the legality of his or her actions.
Paragraph 2 of the special introduction clarified this concept further by stating that there was
"no requirement to prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to whether the
use of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations". It was noted that
this approach had been taken in respect of other crimes within the Court's jurisdiction as well
(see e.g. Element 3 of the war crime of pillaging).
18. Some delegations questioned the use of the term "being aware" in Element 4 and
whether it was different from "knowing". In response, it was pointed out that article 30 of the
Rome Statute equated "knowledge" and "awareness", and that the existing Elements of
Crimes used the latter term to denote the former. It was questioned whether factual
circumstances might include developments taking place at the United Nations. The view was
expressed that the existence or non-existence of a Security Council resolution on the use of
armed force was indeed a relevant "factual circumstance", but that Element 4 did not require
the Prosecutor to prove that the perpetrator made any specific legal assessment regarding the
content of such a resolution.
19. With reference to a discussion raised in paragraph 2 of the special introduction, it was
noted that the mental element contained in Element 4 did not include a standard of
negligence. This was considered appropriate in light of article 30 of the Rome Statute and the
definition of the crime of aggression. In a common law system, Element 4 would require
actual knowledge, rather than constructive knowledge or imputed knowledge.
20. Some delegations suggested that the link between Elements 3 and 4 could be spelled
out more clearly through drafting changes, in particular by using the word "such" in Element
4, similar to its use in Element 6. In the context of this discussion, it was further suggested to
refer, in Element 4, to the factual circumstances establishing the "act of aggression", rather
than to the "inconsistency of the use of armed force by the State with the Charter of the
United Nations". Furthermore, it was suggested to use the past tense ("established") rather
than the gerund ("establishing") or the present tense ("establishes"). While some participants
argued that "establishing" would be more appropriate, as it would better fit with the timing of
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the events (e.g. the planning that precedes the actual act of aggression), others preferred the
past tense, which was commonly used in the existing Elements of Crimes.
21. Following those discussions, the Chairman suggested to change proposed Element 4
to read: "The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established such an act
of aggression." However, it was observed that the proposed language might cause difficulties
in the relation between Elements 1 and 4. One of the concerns expressed was that the judges
might misread the new formulation to imply that the mental element of intent (the default rule
applying to Element 1) applied to all the material elements of the crime of aggression,
including the inconsistency of the use of force with the Charter of the United Nations. The
Chairman therefore reverted to the previous formulation, with only minor drafting changes:
"The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that such a use of
armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations".
22. The suggestion was also made to change paragraph 2 of the special introduction to
read "...there is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to
the existence of the act of aggression". Some participants cautioned, however, that the
previous wording of paragraph 2 of the special introduction was very precise in that it
specified the legal evaluation referred to, namely the legal evaluation of the inconsistency of
the use of armed force by the State with the Charter of the United Nations. The previous
language was eventually retained with some editorial changes: "There is no requirement to
prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to whether the use of armed force
was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations."
Proposed Elements 5 and 6: The threshold of a manifest violation of the United Nations
Charter
23. Proposed Element 5 describes the threshold requirement contained in draft article 8
bis, paragraph 1, which requires that the act of aggression "by its character, gravity and scale,
constituted a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations". Proposed Element 6
suggests, based on the same considerations as those regarding Elements 3 and 4 above, a
requirement that the perpetrator was aware of the "factual circumstances that established such
a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations". Paragraph 4 of the special
introduction further clarifies this concept by stating that there is "no requirement to prove that
the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to the 'manifest' nature of the violation of the
Charter of the United Nations".
24. In the context of the discussion on Elements 5 and 6, some delegations reiterated their
view that the provisions on aggression should not contain such a threshold requirement,
whereas others recalled their position in favour of the threshold clause.8 It was, however,
understood that any change to the threshold requirement would have to be made in the draft
amendment on the crime of aggression, and that Elements 5 and 6 adequately reflected the
threshold clause currently contained in draft article 8 bis, paragraph 1. Some delegations
noted that Elements 4 and 6 appeared repetitive. In response, it was noted that these Elements
dealt with two different qualifiers: Element 4 dealt with the legal qualification that established
the use of armed force as an act of aggression, and Element 6 dealt with the legal qualification
that established an act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, as a manifest
violation of the United Nations Charter. The latter qualification was relevant to determine
8 See the discussions and arguments in the February 2009 SWGCA report, in Official Records of the
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Seventh session (first
and second resumptions), New York, 19-23 January and 9-13 February 2009 (International Criminal
Court publication, ICC-ASP/7/20/Add.1), chapter II, annex II, paragraph 13; and in the June 2008
SWGCA report, in Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, Resumed sixth session, New York, 2-6 June 2008 (International Criminal
Court publication, ICC-ASP/6/20/Add. 1), annex II, paragraphs 23-29.
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whether the Court had jurisdiction and would exclude situations that could fall within a legal
grey area, but was without prejudice to other legal avenues that the victim State might want to
pursue, such as a ruling by the International Court of Justice on the act of aggression.
25. In the context of both Elements 5 and 6, paragraph 3, of the special introduction states
that the term "manifest" is an objective qualification. It was noted that a similar clarification
could be found in the special introduction to the Elements of the crime of genocide. Some
delegations raised questions regarding the meaning of the term "objective" in this context. In
response, it was submitted that the Court's determination as to whether the act of aggression
constituted, by its character, gravity and scale, a "manifest" violation would be decisive,
rather than the perpetrator's legal assessment. It was suggested that the Court would apply the
standard of a "reasonable leader", similar to the standard of the "reasonable soldier" which
was embodied in the concept of manifestly unlawful orders in article 33 of the Rome Statute.
26. A suggestion was made to delete the word "legal" from paragraph 4 of the special
introduction. It was argued, in particular, that the evaluation of the manifest nature of the
Charter violation could be a "value judgment" in the sense of paragraph 4 of the general
introduction to the existing Elements of Crimes. It might therefore be better to simply refer to
an evaluation, rather than a legal evaluation, in order not to set the bar too high for the
Prosecutor and the judges. The suggestion did not, however, meet with the agreement of other
participants, who found the current formulation of paragraph 4 of the special introduction to
be accurate. It was also pointed out that the same phrase was used in the special introduction
to the Elements of War Crimes.
27. The suggestion was made to replace the phrase "As a result of' with the phrase "With
respect to" in paragraph 4 of the special introduction, as well as in paragraph 2 of the special
introduction, since that was the usual way of referencing the Elements in the special
introductions. The suggestion met with initial agreement, while some caution was also
expressed. It was explained that the previous wording was intended to ensure, out of an
abundance of caution, that the "factual circumstance" element contained in Element 4 was
indeed the relevant mental element for the act of aggression throughout all the Elements,
despite the fact that the term "act of aggression" also appeared in Element 1. For greater
clarity, it was eventually agreed that the words "As a result of' or "With respect to" should be
deleted from paragraphs 2 and 4 of the special introduction. With regard to paragraph 3, it
was also agreed that the phrase "With respect to elements 5 and 6" would be deleted since
"manifest" only appears in those two elements.
Changes to the draft Elements of Crimes
28. The Chairman circulated revised draft Elements of Crimes (annex I), reflecting the
various changes outlined in the paragraphs above.
IlI. Non-paper on the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction
29. The Chairman introduced the non-paper on the conditions for the exercise of
jurisdiction, which was aimed at facilitating discussions on the major outstanding issues.
These were primarily reflected in draft article 15 bis, paragraph 4, of the Group's proposals,
but also linked to the question of the entry into force procedure (article 121, paragraph 4 or 5).
The Chairman suggested that the inter-sessional meeting should be used to intensify the
dialogue on how to bridge the gap on the outstanding issues, including on the basis of new
ideas and suggestions.
30. The Chairman noted that the non-paper contained the following three underlying
considerations for the discussion, based on past work of the Group, which had to be kept in
mind:
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a) All three existing trigger mechanisms would apply to the crime of aggression;
b) In the case of a Security Council referral, the Court could exercise jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression irrespective of the consent of the State concerned;
and
c) In case of a State referral or proprio motu investigation, the territoriality or
nationality requirement of article 12, paragraph 2, of the Statute would apply.
Since the crime of aggression was typically committed on the territory of both
the aggressor and the victim State,9 it was therefore useful in the discussion to
refer to either an alleged aggressor State or an alleged victim State, rather than
to a State of territoriality.
31. The non-paper contains in its appendix a number of concrete questions suggested by
the Chairman. These questions are reprinted in italics below, in the context of the respective
discussions.
1. Consent of the alleged aggressor State as condition for the exercise of
jurisdiction"
Acceptance of the amendment on the crime of aggression by the alleged aggressor State
32. The Chairman noted that consent of the alleged aggressor State was only relevant to
State referrals and proprio motu investigations. Acceptance of the amendment on aggression
was one way a State could express its consent to the Court's exercise of jurisdiction with
respect to any future investigation into an act of aggression allegedly committed by that State.
One basic question was therefore: Should the Court be able to exercise jurisdiction with
respect to a crime of aggression on the basis of a State referral or proprio motu investigation
where the alleged aggressor State has not accepted the amendment on aggression, or is not a
State Party to the Rome Statute?
33. Participants' views on this question were divided. Some participants answered
negatively, stating that the alleged aggressor State must have accepted the amendment on
aggression. Such an approach would indeed differ from the approach taken in the Rome
Statute with respect to other crimes, but that distinction was justified by the nature of the
crime of aggression and by the need to find a politically acceptable solution. It was further
argued that only the application of article 121, paragraph 5, of the Statute would give States
Parties the opportunity to choose to agree to the Court's jurisdiction. Under international law,
no treaty obligations could be created for non-States Parties. The point was made that States
Parties that have not accepted the amendment and non-States Parties should also be treated
equally, and that therefore the "negative" understanding" of the second sentence of article
121, paragraph 5, of the Statute should prevail. Some participants argued that, in addition to
the requirement that the alleged aggressor State has accepted the amendment, the Security
Council should retain a strong role.
9 While the issue was not further discussed, the view was expressed that the crime of aggression was not
typically committed on the territory of both the aggressor and the victim State. Rather, the individual
conduct would typically only take place on the territory of the aggressor State.
10 The headings of this part of the report are identical to the headings in the non-paper by the Chairman
on the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction (see annex 1I). The view was expressed that these
headings were not sufficiently accurate, in particular with regard to the notion of "consent by the
aggressor State" which had not previously been understood as forming part of the discussion on the
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction.
1 See paragraph 9 of the non-paper by the Chairman on the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction
(annex Il).
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34. Some participants answered the qucstion more broadly: They agreed that the Court
should only have jurisdiction over States that were bound by the amendment. The amendment
had to have entered into force for the alleged aggressor State, which, in case of article 121,
paragraph 4, of the Rome Statute, could happen without the State's acceptance of the
amendment.
35. Some participants indicated their flexibility on this question in case a consensus
emerged on one or the other answer. It was also noted that the question involved some very
difficult policy choices as to what was best for the International Criminal Court and for
universal ratification of its Statute. A political compromise was therefore needed. In this
context, the idea of reciprocity was mentioned: Both the alleged aggressor and victim State
would have to be bound by the amendment on aggression. That would, on the one hand, raise
the bar even higher, but still might make the solution more attractive, as it would allow the
Court to fully investigate the actions of both parties to the conflict. In addition, the idea was
raised that both the alleged aggressor and victim State would indicate the acceptable
jurisdictional filters 2 upon their acceptance of the amendment, and that such filters would
only apply to the extent that there was reciprocity between the relevant States. There was no
thorough discussion of the idea of reciprocity, while a view was expressed that such an idea
was not suitable for the Rome Statute, whose primary focus was not the regulation of mutual
obligations between States, but the pursuit of individual criminal justice.
36. Some participants answered the question above affirmatively, arguing that otherwise
a victim State that had accepted the amendment on aggression would not be protected against
aggression, and that some States would have the privilege of shielding their nationals from the
Court. A system that required the consent of the future aggressor State would not have any
deterrent effect. Ending impunity for the most serious crimes of international concern was the
primary purpose of the Court. It was noted that in accordance with article 12 of the Rome
Statute, the territory of the victim State would already provide the necessary jurisdictional
nexus and, in this connection, a way should be found for the Court to exercise jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression, at least in respect of crimes committed on the territory of the
victim State. If the consent of the alleged aggressor State was required, the Court might never
be able to exercise jurisdiction, except in case of Security Council referrals. It was pointed out
that the Court would only prosecute individuals, not States, and that any such individual
would otherwise be subject to the domestic jurisdiction of the victim State where the crime
was committed. The Court's jurisdiction was therefore delegated to it by the victim State.
Furthermore, the view was held that such a requirement would establish two different
jurisdictional systems within the Rome Statute, which should be avoided. Such different
jurisdictional systems would amount to a reservation to the Statute, which was prohibited
under its article 120. In response, it was noted that article 5, paragraph 2, of the Statute
explicitly envisaged the possibility of different conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression. The view was also expressed that States Parties to the Rome Statute
had already consented to the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, as reflected in
article 5 of the Rome Statute. In response, it was noted that subject-matter jurisdiction had to
be distinguished from jurisdiction ratione personae.
37. Some participants suggested that the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction be
discussed separately from the entry into force procedure. In this context, it was suggested that
article 121, paragraphs 4 and 5, of the Rome Statute would not apply at all. Instead, article 5,
paragraph 2, of the Rome Statute only required that a provision be "adopted in accordance
with articles 121 and 123". There was no need for ratification of such a provision once it was
adopted by the Review Conference in accordance with article 121, paragraph 3, of the Statute.
12 The term "jurisdictional filters" refers to the possible role of the Security Council, Pre-Trial Chamber,
General Assembly and/or International Court of Justice and is first introduced in the non-paper by the
Chairman on the exercise of jurisdiction (annex Ill).
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This procedure would, however, still allow for additional mechanisms dealing with the
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, such as jurisdictional declarations or the possibility
of ad hoc consent by non-States Parties. Once there was an agreement on the political
questions, such as the question of consent of the alleged aggressor State, this procedural
approach could prove to be useful. In response, it was pointed out that such an approach,
which was contrary to normal international practice, could create problems at the domestic
level, where the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction and the incorporation of the crime of
aggression into domestic law would require a constitutional process of ratification and failed
to distinguish between the entry into force of the amendment and its entry into force for a
particular State. In this context, it was also suggested that such a provision adopted by the
Review Conference could contain a clause delaying its entry into force by one or two years, in
order to allow States to make the necessary changes to their domestic laws.
Other ways of addressing the issue of consent by the alleged aggressor State
38. The Chairman noted that the question of consent was closely related to the issue of
the entry into force procedure (article 121, paragraph 4 or 5). In the past, some delegations
had raised concerns regarding the option of using article 121, paragraph 4, since that
provision would allow the amendment on aggression to enter into force with respect to States
Parties that had not accepted the amendment and possibly against their will, once the
amendment was otherwise ratified by seven-eighths of States Parties. In this context, the
Chairman raised the following question: Could the idea of an opt-in declaration, in addition
to the requirement that the alleged aggressor State be bound by the amendment on
aggression, address the concerns of those delegations that have expressed difficulty with
using the entry into force procedure of article 121, paragraph 4, of the Statute?
39. There was only limited discussion of this question. Some participants who favoured
article 121, paragraph 5, stated that they could accept the application of article 121, paragraph
4, if combined with an opt-in declaration, as the effect would be similar to that of article 121,
paragraph 5. It was, however, noted that this would significantly delay the Court's jurisdiction
on the basis of any of the three triggers, including possibly the Security Council trigger,
which would become effective only one year after the acceptance of the amendment on
aggression by seven-eighths of States Parties. Such an opt-in declaration would also be
contrary to the spirit of article 121, paragraph 4. Some participants who favoured the use of
article 121, paragraph 4, of the Rome Statute expressed the view that no such opt-in
requirement should be added.
40. The Chairman raised the idea that, instead of an opt-in declaration, States could be
given the possibility of making an opt-out declaration regarding the crime of aggression,
similar to article 124 of the Statute. In order to fully address sovereignty concerns, such a
declaration could possibly be renewable, and possibly be available for non-States Parties as
well. Could the idea of an opt-out declaration be further explored to serve as a bridge
between the wish for a broad base of Court jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and the
wish to respect sovereignty concerns?
41. There was only limited discussion of this question. Some participants expressed
interest in the idea of an opt-out declaration, combined with a system that would otherwise
not require that the alleged aggressor State has accepted the amendment on aggression. Such
an approach would strongly reduce the number of States who were beyond the Court's
jurisdictional reach, as it would exclude only those States who took an active step to that
effect. A system that required potential aggressor States to accept the amendment would not
be effective: It was unlikely that such States would move to take such a step. An opt-out
declaration, however, reversed that default situation and provided an incentive for States to
reflect on the amendment and to come to a decision as to whether they could live with the
amendment or not.
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42. The Chairman noted that a determination of an act of aggression by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) in contentious proceedings could only be made on the basis of the prior
consent of the alleged aggressor State to the ICJ's jurisdiction. Could a link to the ICJ's
consent-based contentious jurisdiction address concerns regarding the consent of the alleged
aggressor State, at least in an indirect way?
43. There was only limited discussion of this question. The view was expressed that such
instrumentalization of the ICJ would be legally problematic and not work in practice, as the
ICJ would try to avoid use of the term "act of aggression". Furthermore, the ICJ's
involvement could significantly delay the proceedings. It was also suggested that the link
between a State's consent to the ICJ's jurisdiction (which may lead to a determination by the
ICJ of an act of aggression) and that State's consent to the ICC's jurisdiction over the crime
of aggression was too indirect to serve a useful purpose.
2. Jurisdictional filters
44. The Chairman recalled that delegations still had divergent views on the question of
the jurisdictional filter to be applied in draft article 15 bis, paragraph 4. He suggested
deepening the discussions by addressing some specific scenarios.
Self-referral by the aggressor State
45. The Chairman noted that one such scenario was the self-referral by the aggressor
State itself, e.g. following a change of government in that State. If a State would refer a
situation to the Court specifically for the purpose of prosecuting its own former leader(s) for
a crime of aggression committed by that State, would there still be a need for a jurisdictional
filter?
46. The views on this question were divided. Some participants favoured the application
of a jurisdictional filter in this scenario. Some specifically noted the role of the Security
Council under the United Nations Charter, while others referred to the useful role of other
filters, such as the Pre-Trial Chamber or the General Assembly. Jurisdictional filters were
meant to ensure that the Court was not seized with frivolous or politically motivated cases,
thereby protecting the Court. Such situations could also arise in case of self-referrals by the
aggressor State, precisely as a consequence of the change of government. It was noted that a
requirement of consent by the alleged aggressor State and the issue of the jurisdictional filters
were inter-related in certain ways, but that politically acceptable solutions had to be found in
respect of both: A solution to one issue would not simply take care of the other.
47. Other participants expressed the view that no jurisdictional filter was required in such
a situation in light of the alleged aggressor State's consent, as expressed by the referral of the
case to the Court. In such a case, the Rome Statute already provided for filters against
politically motivated investigations through the respective roles of the Office of the
Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber. The view was also expressed that the question related
to several jurisdictional filters of a very different nature, which made it difficult to provide a
single answer. In this context, some participants recalled their general opposition to any kind
of jurisdictional filter for the crime of aggression.
Referral by the Security Council
48. The Chairman raised the scenario in which the Security Council would refer a
situation to the Court without having made a determination of aggression. It could appear that
only other crimes had been committed, or there could be other reasons why the Security
Council did not make a determination of an act of aggression. Where the Court is seized with
a situation only because of a Security Council referral, could it be argued that the Security
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Council should retain the priority right to determine an act of aggression (or at least to give
the "green light") - as the Council might otherwise simply choose not to make a referral at
all?
49. There was only limited discussion of this question. Some participants argued that
even in case of a Security Council referral, the Council's inaction regarding a determination
of an act of aggression should not block the investigation into a crime of aggression. It was
recalled that the Security Council could always suspend an investigation or prosecution under
article 16 of the Rome Statute, which was sufficient to address any possible concerns by the
Council. It was also argued that assigning such a priority right to the Security Council might
result in one-sided prosecutions, whereby the crimes of only one side to the conflict might be
prosecuted (e.g. war crimes committed in the course of a war against an aggressor), while the
other side could enjoy impunity for the act of aggression.
50. Some participants thought that it was premature to contemplate this scenario. Others
found that it was purely hypothetical to assume that the Security Council would make a
referral as described above. However, the opposite view was also expressed, in particular as a
non-international armed conflict might turn out to be of an international nature on the basis of
new evidence.
51. It was observed that the scenario described above could be seen as a "qualified"
referral by the Security Council: The Council would be allowed to refer a situation to the
Court, but at the same time to reserve its approval of an investigation into a crime of
aggression for a later stage. The Prosecutor would in any event be allowed to proceed with
investigating with respect to the three other crimes, but in the absence of a later determination
of aggression by the Council (or in the absence of a "green light"), the investigation into a
crime of aggression could not proceed. It was questioned whether such a qualified referral
was compatible with article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute. At the same time, it was pointed out
that the possibility of such a qualified referral was inherent in the current text of alternative 1
of draft article 15 bis, paragraph 4.
52. The view was expressed that it should be easy to concede that the Security Council
should be allowed to retain control over the question of aggression, if the Council's referral
was the only manner in which the Court's jurisdiction was triggered in the first place.
Proprio motu investigation and referral by the victim State
53. The Chairman suggested to continue discussion on the various options for
jurisdictional filters with a view to identifying avenues toward a compromise, and briefly
raised further questions contained in the non-paper. There was, however, no further
discussion on these questions. These and other issues will thus have to be taken up in the
context of the future work of the Assembly of States Parties on the crime of aggression.
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Annex I
Draft Elements of Crimes
Article 8 bis
Crime of aggression
Introduction
1. It is understood that any of the acts referred to in article 8 bis, paragraph 2, qualify as
an act of aggression.
2. There is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to
whether the use of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The term "manifest" is an objective qualification.
4. There is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to
the "manifest" nature of the violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
Elements
1. The perpetrator planned, prepared, initiated or executed an act of aggression.
2. The perpetrator was a person' in a position effectively to exercise control over or to
direct the political or military action of the State which committed the act of aggression.
3. The act of aggression - the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations - was committed.
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that such a
use of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
5. The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constituted a manifest
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established such a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
1 With respect to an act of aggression, more than one person may be in a position that meets these
criteria.
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Annex II
Non-paper by the Chairman on the Elements of Crimes
1. The present non-paper is aimed at facilitating the discussions at the Princeton Club on
the Elements of the crime of aggression and reflects the progress made during the substantive
discussions on the definition of the crime since the circulation of the draft Elements in 2002.' It
follows up on the work done pursuant to the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, as set out
in resolution F of the Final Act of the Rome Conference,2 and the Special Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression (hereinafter "the Group"), pursuant to resolution ICC-ASP/l/Res.1 of
the Assembly of States Parties on "The Continuity of work in respect of the crime of
aggression",3 also referred to in paragraph 30 of the report of the Group of November 2008. 4
This non-paper is intended to promote in-depth consideration of the Elements as part of the
overall process leading up to the Review Conference.
2. A discussion paper, prepared by Australia and Samoa, was informally distributed at the
last meeting of the Group in February 2009 and thereafter considered at a small informal retreat
on the Elements of Crimes for the crime of aggression, held at Montreux, Switzerland, from
16-18 April 2009. A brief summary of the discussions at the retreat has been circulated
separately. During this retreat, several options for possible Elements were envisaged, and a
number of drafting ideas were suggested.
3. The present non-paper builds on this work and contains
appendix I, as well as detailed explanations in appendix II. It is
for the purpose of facilitating discussions.
a draft of the Elements in
submitted by the Chairman
1 Discussion paper on the definition and elements of the crime of aggression, prepared by the
Coordinator of the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2).
2 Official Records of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June / 17 July 1998, (UN doc.
A/CONF.183/13, vol. I).
3 Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, First session, New York, 3-10 September 2002 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.V.2
and corrigendum), part IV, resolution ICC-ASP/l/Res. .
4 Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, Seventh session, The Hague, 14-22 November 2008 (International Criminal Court publication,
ICC-ASP/7/20), vol. I, annex III.
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Appendix I
Draft Elements of Crimes
Article 8 bis
Crime of aggression
Introduction
1. It is understood that any of the acts referred to in article 8 bis, paragraph 2, qualify as
an act of aggression.
2. As a result of Element 4, there is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator has
made a legal evaluation as to the inconsistency with the Charter of the United Nations of the
use of armed force by the State.
3. With respect to Elements 5 and 6, the term "manifest" is an objective qualification.
4. As a result of Element 6, there is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator has
made a legal evaluation as to the "manifest" nature of the violation.
Elements
1. The perpetrator planned, prepared, initiated or executed an act of aggression.
2. The perpetrator was a person' in a position effectively to exercise control over or to
direct the political or military action of the State which committed the act of aggression.
3. The act of aggression - the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations - was committed.
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances establishing the inconsistency
of the use of armed force by the State with the Charter of the United Nations.
5. The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constituted a manifest
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances establishing such a manifest
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
1 With respect to an act of aggression, more than one person may be in a position that meets these
criteria.
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Appendix II
Explanatory note
I. The existing general introduction to the Elements of Crimes
1. The existing general introduction to the Elements of Crimes explains several issues
relating to the Elements of Crimes. For example, it clarifies the relationship between the
Elements and other general principles in part 3 of the Statute, explains several issues of
terminology and comments on the structure of the Elements.
2. The proposals of the Group contain a draft amendment to article 9 of the Rome
Statute that would add a reference to the crime of aggression.' Paragraph 1 of the general
introduction to the Elements of Crimes would require a similar amendment, replacing the
words "articles 6, 7 and 8" with the words "articles 6, 7, 8 and 8 bis".
3. It is considered that the other parts of the general introduction can be applied to the
Elements for the crime of aggression without further modification.
II. The special introduction for the Elements of the crime of aggression
4. The existing Elements of Crimes contain, in addition to the general introduction,
"special" introductions to each crime under the Court's jurisdiction. This non-paper suggests
such a "special" introduction for the crime of aggression which is intended to provide
additional guidance in relation to several issues arising from the proposed Elements of the
crime of aggression.
5. Paragraph 1 clarifies that the whole of the definition of an act of aggression in draft
article 8 bis, paragraph 2, continues to apply, despite the fact that the language of proposed
Element 3 focuses only on part of this definition. As it would be cumbersome to repeat the
whole definition in Element 3, paragraph 1 clarifies that the Elements do not alter that
definition.
6. Paragraph 2 makes clear that proposed Element 4 proposes a mental element of
"knowledge of fact" in respect of the inconsistency of a State use of force by a State with the
Charter of the United Nations. This clarifies that the perpetrator is not required to have
knowledge of the legal doctrine and rules used to evaluate whether a State use of force is
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, but is only required to have awareness of
the factual circumstances establishing this inconsistency. A parallel can be found in the first
dot point of paragraph 3 of the "special" introduction for the Elements of war crimes which
clarifies that the last two elements of war crimes do not impose a requirement for a legal
evaluation by the perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its character as
international or non-international.
1 See February 2009 SWGCA report, paragraph 26, in Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Seventh session (first and second resumptions),
New York, 19-23 January and 9-13 February 2009 (International Criminal Court publication, ICC-
ASP/7/20/Add.1), chapter II, annex II.
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7. Paragraph 3 clarifies that the use of the term "manifest" in proposed Elements 5 and 6
is an objective qualification. In other words, the Court's determination whether the particular
violation of the Charter of the United Nations is objectively a "manifest" violation is decisive,
rather than whether the perpetrator considered it to be a manifest violation. A parallel can be
found in the second dot point of the "special" introduction for the Elements of genocide.
8. Paragraph 4 serves a similar function in respect of proposed Element 6 as paragraph 2
serves in respect of proposed Element 4.
III. Scheme and principles of proposed Elements for the crime of aggression
9. The draft Elements in appendix I follow the scheme and principles of the existing
Elements of Crimes for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These Elements
usually list conduct, consequence and circumstance in that order, with particular mental
elements, where required, listed after the relevant conduct, consequence or circumstance. 2 In
order to present elements which flow logically, the sequencing of proposed elements in
appendix I is slightly different from this general ordering.
10. Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Rome Statute requires that, unless otherwise provided,
a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and
knowledge. Read together with paragraph 2 of the general introduction to the Elements of
Crimes, this means that where no reference is made in the Elements to a particular mental
element for any particular material element listed, the relevant mental element set out in
article 30 - intention, or knowledge, or both - applies. Usually, intention applies to a conduct
or consequence element, and knowledge applies to a circumstance or consequence element.
IV. Proposed Elements 1 and 2: The individual's conduct and the leadership
requirement
11. The wording of proposed Elements I and 2 draws directly from the relevant parts of
draft article 8 bis, paragraph 1, of the proposals for a provision on aggression, elaborated by
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression.3
12. Proposed Element 1 sets out the conduct element for the crime of aggression.
Applying article 30 to the crime of aggression would mean that the perpetrator must have
intended (that is, meant) to plan, prepare, initiate or execute the act of aggression (article 30,
paragraph 2 (a)). The mental element of knowledge will not be applicable here as proposed
Element 1 is a conduct element, and not a circumstance or consequence element. Since the
application of article 30 is sufficiently clear here, there is no need to articulate an express
mental element attaching to proposed Element 1.
13. Proposed Element 1 implies a degree of causation between the perpetrator's
involvement and the occurrence of the State act. However, given the range of factual
situations in which the question of causation might be relevant in a particular case, it does not
seem feasible to outline a general test specifying the nature or degree of causation required,
but preferable to leave this matter to the Court to determine according to the facts of a
particular case before it.
2 Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, First session, New York, 3-10 September 2002 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.V.2
and corrigendum), part IIB, paragraph 7.
3 See February 2009 SWGCA report, in Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Seventh session (first and second resumptions), New York,
19-23 January and 9-13 February 2009 (International Criminal Court publication, ICC-
ASP/7/20/Add. 1), chapter II, annex II, appendix I.
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14. Proposed Element 2 is a circumstance element, that is, it describes a circumstance in
which the conduct in proposed Element 1 is to have taken place. Applying article 30 to
proposed Element 2, this means that the perpetrator must have known (that is, been aware)
that he or she was in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or
military action of the State which committed an act of aggression. Since the application of
article 30 is sufficiently clear here as well, there is no need to articulate an express mental
element attaching to proposed Element 2.
15. The footnote in Element 2 clarifies that, in respect of a particular act of aggression,
more than one person who meets the leadership requirement described in Element 2 may be
potentially liable for a crime of aggression. For example, where a joint decision to commit an
act of aggression is made by two persons who are both "in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action" of a State, both persons may be
potentially liable for the crime.
V. Proposed Elements 3 and 4: The State act of aggression
16. Proposed Element 3 describes the State act of aggression. The proposed element
draws closely on the language of draft article 8 bis, paragraph 2, in the Group's proposals.4
However, the wording has been modified slightly to avoid the use of the active voice. This
follows the drafting technique used in the existing Elements of Crimes according to which the
active voice should only be used in relation to the conduct of an individual perpetrator.5 This
is intended to avoid any confusion which may arise from the use of the active voice in relation
to the acts of the State, which may suggest that the acts of the State constitute a "conduct"
element.
17. As explained further in paragraph 5 above, paragraph 1 of the "special" introduction
clarifies that the whole of the meaning of "act of aggression" as set out in article 8 bis,
paragraph 2, is intended to apply also here.
18. Historical precedents (for example, the High Command Case6) required a high degree
of knowledge of the State's aggressive war to establish individual criminal responsibility.
However, a mental element requiring that the perpetrator positively knew that the State's acts
were inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations (effectively requiring knowledge of
law) may have unintended consequences. For example, it may encourage a potential
perpetrator to be wilfully blind as to the legality of his or her actions, or to rely on
disreputable advice supporting the legality of State acts even if that advice is subsequently
shown to have been incorrect. Also, mental elements requiring knowledge of the law are
regularly avoided in domestic legal systems as they are often difficult to prove to the required
standard.
19. To overcome some of the disadvantages of an express knowledge of law requirement,
proposed Element 4 is instead a "factual circumstances" element, a type of element which is
used frequently in the Elements of Crimes for certain crimes of humanity and war crimes
which involve legal concepts.7 Proposed Element 4 requires that the perpetrator was aware of
4 Ibid.
5 See for example, Element 3 of the war crime of pillaging in article 8 (2) (b) (xvi), which reads "[t]he
appropriation was without the consent of the owner" rather than "[t]he owner did not consent to the
appropriation".
6 United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al. (the High Command case), Judgement, 27, 28
October 1948. See also the very useful work of the Preparatory Commission in its Historical Review of
Developments Relating to Aggression, Table 6 - Knowledge (PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L. I and Add. 1).
7 For example: factual circumstances establishing the lawfulness of a person's presence in an area
(Elements of Crimes, article 7 (1) (d) crime against humanity of deportation or forcible transfer of
population, Elements 2 and 3); the protected status of a person under the Geneva Conventions (see
Elements for most of the war crimes, for example article 8, (2) (a) (i) war crime of wilful killing,
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factual circumstances pointing to the inconsistency of the State's use of armed force with the
United Nations Charter. Although this requirement stops short of requiring knowledge of the
illegality of an act of aggression, it strives for an appropriate balance between the need to
ensure criminal liability where the perpetrator is fully aware of the factual circumstances
surrounding the State act and the need to avoid the disadvantages of a strict "knowledge of
law" approach outlined above.
20. To satisfy proposed Element 4, it would not be sufficient merely to show that the
perpetrator knew of facts indicating that the State used armed force. It would also be
necessary to show that the perpetrator knew of facts establishing the inconsistency of the use
of force with the Charter of the United Nations. Examples of relevant facts here could
include: the fact that the use of force was directed against another State, the existence or
absence of a Security Council resolution, the content of a Security Council resolution, the
existence or absence of a prior or imminent attack by another State.
21. Specifying a mental element of "knowledge of factual circumstances", as opposed to
a mental element of "knowledge of law" may, in principle, have the effect of limiting the
availability of certain mistake of law arguments. 8 However, such mistake of law arguments
would be very difficult to advance anyways, given that only "manifest" Charter violations,
and no borderline cases, would fall under the Court's jurisdiction due to the threshold
requirement in article 8 bis, paragraph 1. In any event, a perpetrator could still raise a defence
of mistake of fact as to this element under article 32, paragraph 1, which, if proven, would
result in acquittal.
22. A further point for consideration is that in a number of the Nuremberg trials, in
addition to actual knowledge, the Tribunal considered the possibility of inferring or imputing
knowledge.9 Paragraph 3 of the general introduction to the Elements already clarifies that the
Court may infer the existence of such knowledge from relevant facts and circumstances. In
addition, however, States may wish to consider whether the Nuremberg jurisprudence
supports (and whether there would be any utility in incorporating) a knowledge element
which expressly allows knowledge to be imputed, or specifies a "should have known"
threshold for the mental element (i.e. a negligence element). While a culpability element of
negligence is used in the Elements of Crimes in relation to certain genocide and war crimes
offences,' ° the compatibility of such elements with the definition of aggression would require
further discussion.
Elements 2 and 3); or the existence of an armed conflict (see Elements for most of the war crimes, for
example Article 8 (2) (a )(i) war crime of wilful killing, Element 5).
8 Article 32, paragraph 2, provides that "[a] mistake of law may, however, be a ground for excluding
criminal responsibility if it negates the mental element required by such a crime
9 See references to Hess, Schacht, Bormann and IG Farben cases in Table 6 (note 6, above).
10 The relevant crimes are: genocide by forcibly transferring children (article 6 (e)); war crime of
improper use of a flag of truce (article 8 (2) (b) (vii)-1); war crime of improper use of a flag, insignia or
uniform of the hostile party (article 8 (2) (b) (vii)-2); war crime of improper use of the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions (article 8 (2) (b) (vii)-4); war crime of using, conscripting or
enlisting children (article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi)); and war crime of using, conscripting and enlisting children
(article 8 (2) (e) (vii)). The mental element of negligence, found in the Elements of Crimes, has been
applied by Pre-Trial Chamber I of the Court in a number of decisions, for example: Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, Lubanga, PTC 1, 29 January 2007 (ICC 01/04-01/06); Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, Katanga and Ndugiolo Chui, PTC 1, 30 September 2008 (ICC 01/04-01/07).
The consistency of the negligence elements with the Statute has not yet been fully argued in the Court.
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VI. Proposed Elements 5 and 6: The threshold requirement
23. Proposed Element 5 describes the threshold requirement in draft article 8 bis,
paragraph 1, that the State act of aggression be a manifest violation of the Charter of the
United Nations in order to attract individual criminal responsibility.
24. Proposed Element 6 sets out a specific mental element for proposed Element 5.
Instead of repeating the full phrase found in the definition and in proposed Element 5 of an
act which "by its character, gravity and scale, constituted a manifest violation of the Charter
of the United Nations", Element 6 uses the term "such a manifest violation of the Charter of
the United Nations".
25. The requirement for knowledge in proposed Element 6 stands in addition to that in
proposed Element 4. This is because there may be instances where an accused is aware of
facts establishing that a State use of force is an act of aggression, but not aware of other facts
establishing that this act of aggression constitutes, by its character, gravity and scale, a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. For example, an accused may be
aware of a movement of some troops across a State border but not aware of the scale of the
attack. For this reason, a separate mental element for Element 6, requiring knowledge of
factual circumstances establishing a manifest violation, is appropriate.
26. As mentioned in paragraph 7 above, paragraph 3 of the "special" introduction
clarifies that the term "manifest" in proposed Elements 5 and 6 is an objective qualification,
that is, it is a matter for the Court to determine. Furthermore, paragraph 4 of the "special"
introduction confirms that there is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator made a legal
evaluation as to the threshold requirement, since proposed Element 6 requires only awareness
by the perpetrator as to relevant facts.
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Annex III
Non-paper by the Chairman
on the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction
I. Introduction
1. The present non-paper is aimed at facilitating discussions at the Princeton Club with
respect to the major outstanding issues regarding the "conditions for the exercise of
jurisdiction" over the crime of aggression. These outstanding issues are primarily reflected in
draft article 15 bis, paragraph 4, of the proposals for a provision on aggression, elaborated by
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (hereinafter "the Group").' The
February 2009 report of the Group notes in this respect that this paragraph requires "further
discussion, including on the basis of new ideas and suggestions".2 The issue of the entry into
force procedure (article 121, paragraph 4 or 5) is directly linked to this question.
2. It is suggested that delegations use the inter-sessional meeting to exchange views on
possible ways of finding an acceptable solution for the outstanding issues, including on the
basis of such new ideas and suggestions. Due to the very complex nature of the issue and the
numerous variables related to the discussion, the Chairman suggests that participants address
specific questions (printed in italics below), dealing with specific scenarios and based on a
number of considerations that can be extracted from the previous work of the Group.
II. Some underlying considerations for a discussion on outstanding issues
3. All three existing trigger mechanisms apply to the crime of aggression. Based on
draft article 15 bis, paragraph 1, the Prosecutor could conduct a preliminary investigation into
a crime of aggression after the use of any of the three existing trigger mechanisms: State
referral, Security Council referral, or proprio motu. The trigger mechanism needs to be
distinguished from the question of a jurisdictional filter that arises only at a later stage, as
envisaged by draft article 15 bis, paragraphs 2-4.
4. In case of a Security Council referral, the Court could exercise jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression irrespective of the consent of the State concerned. This follows from
article 13 (b) of the Statute, and this has also been the clear understanding in the Group.3 The
issue of the territoriality or nationality requirement (article 12, paragraph 2) does not arise in
the context of a Security Council referral.
5. In case of a State referral or proprio motu investigation, the territoriality or
nationality requirement of article 12, paragraph 2, of the Statute applies. In these two
cases, jurisdiction is based on the consent (i.e. consent to be bound by the Rome Statute and
the amendment on aggression) of either the State of nationality or territoriality. In this
context, it is important to note that a crime of aggression is typically committed on the
territory of both the aggressor and the victim State.4 For the sake of clarity in discussions
1 See February 2009 SWGCA report, in Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Seventh session (first and second resumptions), New York,
19-23 January and 9-13 February 2009 (International Criminal Court publication, ICC-
ASP/7/20/Add. 1), chapter II, annex II.
2 Ibid., paragraph 19.
3 Ibid., paragraphs 28 and 29.
4 The Group has addressed the issue of territoriality of the crime in previous reports, see February 2009
SWGCA report, paragraphs 38 and 39, in Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Seventh session (first and second resumptions), New York,
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relating to questions of territoriality, it is therefore useful to refer to an alleged aggressor State
(usually the State of nationality and territoriality of a crime of aggression) and to an alleged
victim State (usually the State of territoriality of a crime of aggression).
Il. Suggested structure for a discussion on outstanding issues
6. The Chairman suggests that the outstanding issues be discussed in a clear and
substantive manner, in order to facilitate a full understanding of all delegations' positions and
to explore ways toward an acceptable solution. At this stage, it would appear useful to focus
that discussion on the substantive concerns of delegations, rather than on the technical
language intended to address these concerns. The following remarks, as well as the questions
contained in the appendix, are aimed at structuring and facilitating such an open discussion.
Two central topics are identified in this context: the question of consent by the alleged
aggressor State (an issue closely related to the choice of either paragraph 4 or 5 of article 121
of the Statute); and the question of jurisdictional filters (reflected in draft article 15 bis,
paragraph 4).
7. It is important to note that the issue of consent by the alleged aggressor State and the
issue of jurisdictional filters are strongly interlinked, and that the options for each issue
should be discussed with the various options for the other issue in mind. The interplay of both
issues has far-reaching consequences for the Court's jurisdiction in a given case.
IV. Consent of the alleged aggressor State as condition for the exercise of
jurisdiction
8. The question of consent by the alleged aggressor State needs to be addressed only
with respect to State referrals and proprio motu investigations. No such consent would be
required in case of a Security Council referral based on the Council's authority under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter.
5
1. Acceptance of the amendment on the crime of aggression by the alleged
aggressor State
9. One manner in which a State could express its consent to the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction with respect to any future investigation relating to an act of aggression allegedly
committed by that State would be the acceptance of the amendment on aggression itself.
Currently, the Group's proposals reflect two approaches to this question:
a) The alleged aggressor State's acceptance of the amendment on aggression
would not be required in the following two cases: First, if article 121,
paragraph 4, of the Statute would govern the entry into force of the
amendment on aggression; and second, if article 121, paragraph 5, of the
Statute would govern the entry into force, combined with a "positive"
understanding of its second sentence.6 In both cases, the victim State's
19-23 January and 9-13 February 2009 (International Criminal Court publication, ICC-
ASP/7/20/Add.1), chapter II, annex II; and November 2008 SWGCA report, paragraphs 28 and 29, in
Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, Seventh session, The Hague, 14-22 November 2008 (International Criminal Court publication,
ICC-ASP/7/20), vol. I, annex HI.
5 November 2008 SWGCA report, paragraphs 28 and 29, in Official Records of the Assembly of States
Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Seventh session, The Hague, 14-22
November 2008 (International Criminal Court publication, ICC-ASP/7/20), vol. I, annex III.
6 Such as an understanding to be contained in the enabling resolution stating that "article 121,
paragraph 5, second sentence, of the Statute does not prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction in
respect of an act of aggression committed against a State Party that has accepted the amendment". See
February 2009 SWGCA report, paragraphs 34-37, in Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Seventh session (first and second resumptions),
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acceptance of the amendment on aggression would suffice to establish the
territorial link required by article 12, paragraph 2 (a), of the Statute. This is the
approach taken by the Rome Statute with respect to other crimes where a
situation involves more than one State.
b) The alleged aggressor State's acceptance of the amendment on aggression
would be required if article 121, paragraph 5, of the Statute would govern
the entry into force, combined with a "negative" understanding of its second
sentence.7 In this case, the aggressor State's acceptance of the amendment on
aggression would be required to establish either the territoriality or nationality
link of article 12, paragraph 2, of the Statute.
2. Other ways of addressing the issue of consent by the alleged aggressor State
10. Irrespective of the issue of acceptance of the amendment on aggression, the Group's
proposals and reports contain some options that would, under some circumstances, effectively
introduce a requirement of direct or indirect consent by the alleged aggressor State.
11. The Group's reports refer to the idea of requiring that the alleged aggressor State has
accepted the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression by way of an opt-in
declaration. The requirement of such a declaration would effectively limit the Court's
jurisdiction on the basis of State referrals and proprio motu investigations to cases of alleged
aggression by States Parties that have accepted the amendment on aggression and have made
a declaration accepting the amendment.8 As a consequence, the difference in the application
of either paragraph 4 or 5 of article 121 to the amendment on aggression would be strongly
diminished: Either way, no State Party could be subject to the Court's jurisdiction on
aggression against its will.
12. The idea of a declaration could be further adapted in order to increase the likelihood
that the Court would indeed have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in future cases.
Instead of requiring an opt-in declaration, States could be given the possibility of making an
opt-out declaration regarding the crime of aggression similar to article 124 of the Statute. In
order to fully address sovereignty concerns, such a declaration could possibly be renewable,
and possibly be open for non-States Parties as well.
13. A role for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a jurisdictional filter could also
be regarded as a requirement of indirect consent by the alleged aggressor State: The
determination of an act of aggression by the ICJ under draft article 15 bis, paragraph 4,
alternative 2, option 4, could be made in contentious ICJ proceedings, which are consent-
based.
New York, 19-23 January and 9-13 February 2009 (International Criminal Court publication, ICC-
ASP/7/20/Add. 1), chapter II, annex II.
7 Such as an understanding to be contained in the enabling resolution stating that "article 121,
paragraph 5, second sentence, of the Statute prevents the Court from exercising jurisdiction in respect of
an act of aggression committed by any State that has not accepted the amendment". See February 2009
SWGCA report, paragraphs 34-37, in Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Seventh session (first and second resumptions), New York,
19-23 January and 9-13 February 2009 (International Criminal Court publication, ICC-
ASP/7/20/Add. 1), chapter II, annex II.
8 February 2009 SWGCA report, paragraph 9, in Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Seventh session (first and second resumptions), New
York, 19-23 January and 9-13 February 2009 (International Criminal Court publication, ICC-
ASP/7/20/Add. 1), chapter H, annex II.
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V. Jurisdictional filters
14. The various options for jurisdictional filters contained in draft article 15 bis,
paragraph 4 (Security Council, Pre-Trial Chamber, General Assembly, International Court of
Justice), would each constitute a condition for the exercise of jurisdiction and should be
looked at in connection with the issue of consent addressed above.
15. During previous discussions in the Group, delegations voiced different preferences
regarding the alternatives and options contained in draft article 15 bis, paragraph 4. In order to
deepen those discussions, it is suggested to address some specific scenarios separately:
1. Self-referral by the aggressor State
16. A situation could arise in which a State, that has committed aggression against
another State, would be willing to refer the situation to the Court, e.g. following a change of
government in the aggressor State.9 The aggressor State might, for practical reasons, be
unable to carry out the investigation and prosecution, while having all domestic laws in place
to prosecute its former leader(s) for the crime of aggression.
2. Referral by the Security Council
17. The Security Council could refer a situation to the Court without making a
determination of aggression. It could appear that only other crimes under article 5 of the
Statute have been committed, or there could be other reasons why the Security Council did
not make a determination of an act of aggression. If the Court would nevertheless be allowed
to prosecute a crime of aggression on the basis of such a general Security Council referral,
then the Security Council might choose not to make such a referral at all.
3. Proprio motu investigation and referral by the victim State
18. The alternatives and options contained in draft article 15 bis, paragraph 4, have so far
been mainly discussed with proprio motu investigations and referrals by the victim State or by
third States in mind. It is suggested to discuss the various options with specific regard to their
respective potential as part of a compromise solution.
19. The above discussion (paragraphs 8-13) on the requirement of consent by the alleged
aggressor State could usefully be taken up in the context of the jurisdictional filter again, with
the benefit of just having discussed the latter issue in detail.
9 Possibly through a declaration in accordance with article 12, paragraph 3, of the Statute.
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Appendix
Questions for discussion
I. Consent of the alleged aggressor State as condition for the exercise of
jurisdiction
Security Council referral State referral and proprio motu
(Consent of the alleged
aggressor State not
required)
Acceptance of the amendment on the crime of aggression by
the alleged aggressor State
1. Should the Court be able to exercise jurisdiction with
respect to a crime of aggression on the basis of a State referral
or proprio motu investigation where the alleged aggressor
State has not accepted the amendment on aggression, or is not
a State Party to the Rome Statute?
2. Could the concerns of those delegations that prefer, in
principle, a requirement that the alleged aggressor State has
accepted the amendment on aggression be addressed
differently through other consent-based elements or through
the jurisdictionalfilter?
Other ways of addressing the issue of consent by the alleged
aggressor State
3. Could the idea of requiring an opt-in declaration, in
addition to the requirement that the alleged aggressor State be
bound by the amendment on aggression, address the concerns
of those delegations that have expressed difficulty with using
the entry into force procedure of article 121, paragraph 4, of
the Statute?
4. Could the idea of an opt-out declaration be further
explored to serve as a bridge between the wish for a broad base
of Court jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and the wish
to respect sovereignty concerns?
5. Could a link to the ICJ's consent-based contentious
jurisdiction address concerns regarding the consent by the
alleged aggressor State, at least in an indirect way?
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II. Jurisdictional filters
Security Council referral [State referral and proprio motu
1. Where the Court is
seized with a situation only
because of a Security
Council referral, could it
be argued that the Security
Council should retain the
priority right to determine
an act of aggression - as
the Council might
otherwise simply choose
not to make a referral at
all?
2. If the prior consent of an alleged aggressor State were
required (e.g. through acceptance of the amendment, or a
declaration, or indirectly via contentious ICJ proceedings),
would there still be a need for a jurisdictional filter in case of
State referrals and proprio motu investigations?
3. If a State would refer a situation to the Court
specifically for the purpose of prosecuting its own former
leader(s) for a crime of aggression committed by that State,
would there still be a needfor ajurisdictionalfilter?
4. Which of the elements contained in draft article 15 bis,
paragraph 4, could serve as part of a compromise solution?
Where exactly does the compromise lie in each of these
elements? Which other suggestions relating to the
jurisdictional filter could be helpful in the search for a
compromise?
5. Would any of the jurisdictional filters contained in
draft article 15 bis, paragraph 4, have to be combined with a
requirement of consent by the alleged aggressor State?
